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Abstract: This paper explores and reveals some hitherto concealed 
powers relations in the European Union’s new political-economic 
governance procedures. It does this through an empirical investigation of 
the fisheries stakeholder forum, the North Sea Regional Advisory Council. 
It shows that although governance arrangements are now designed to be 
more inclusive than they were before the CFP (Common Fisheries Policy 
reforms), they do still involve exclusions, and uneven power relations that 
are not always readily apparent. The paper is based on research carried out 
by the author, comprising a case study of the CFP governance reforms. 
The research includes analysis of EU policy documents, press reports and 
websites and over 50 interviews with key players in North Sea fisheries 
governance.  
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1 Introduction  
One of the European Union’s most recent concerns is that its policymaking should be 
relevant, transparent and perhaps most importantly, participatory – these are the so-called 
principles of ‘good governance’. It is thought that such laudable principles are being 
realised through the development of new governance practices involving stakeholders in 
decision-making in new and ostensibly more effective ways. Simultaneously, policy  
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statements emanating from the EU have shown increasing concern that economic 
development should be sustainable, not only in its own terms but also ecologically and 
socially. In pursuit of this aim, stakeholders are increasingly being brought into the 
European political process – partly in an attempt to deal with the failure of state 
institutions alone to ameliorate environmental degradation (Bulkeley and Mol, 2003), but 
also in the belief that full participation and consultation with interest groups will 
ultimately contribute towards sustainability (see the EU’s White Paper on Governance 
(CEC, 2001)).  
Good governance principles imply a system that is more inclusive, and where power is 
equally shared between interest groups, private and public and is relatively free of 
conflict. But most governance theory does not seem to interrogate the possibilities for 
uneven power relations to persist, in a situation where, amidst the proliferation of 
stakeholders non-state, private and perhaps even unaccountable interests are involved in 
making political decisions. Very little academic work has examined critically these new 
political arrangements formed in the name of ‘good governance’. I intend to do this here, 
with a view to testing some of the assumptions behind the introduction of the concept of 
better governance, and suggesting some problem areas that might still need to be 
addressed.  
Governance refers to how we make decisions and who participates in these decisions 
(WRI, 2003): in other words all the mechanisms used to produce political outcomes, 
including not just high profile deliberations by governments but all the ways in which 
decisions are made. Decision-making in the EU now involves a wide range of actors, 
whose interactions are complex. They now include public interests such as local, regional 
and national governments, civic organisations, scientists and labour unions, and private 
interest groups and individual corporations – although the lines between public and 
private responsibility are blurring (Young, 1994; Paterson, 1999). Good governance also 
involves new processes, between states and non-state actors interacting in (ostensibly) 
non-hierarchical and thus more networked and pluralist ways (Jachtenfuchs, 1997). One 
of these processes involves greater deliberation between stakeholders, in which, 
theoretically, they should reach shared understandings, and ultimately develop genuine 
consensus. This requires stakeholders debating, ‘rationally’, from first principles about 
the nature of the problems and what can be done about them, in an environment 
(hypothetically) free of conflict. All this should lead to better quality policy (Dryzek, 
1997; Hayward, 1995).  
‘Good governance’ is fast becoming a buzz phrase in relation to fisheries resource 
management. The EU’s Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) has been criticised for its 
cumbersome nature and for not being able to respond quickly enough to sharp reductions 
in fish stocks or to take sufficient account of fishermen’s circumstances (Griffin, 2006). It 
is thought that by improving governance and enhancing stakeholder involvement, the 
management regime’s lack of responsiveness to economic and ecological crises will be 
remedied. Fisheries Regional Advisory Councils (RACs) are to be part of this drive. They 
are intended to involve all interested stakeholders, to be open and accountable to 
participants and to support other EU policy. While there is no doubt that the RACs 
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represent a more dialogic style and feature deliberation, they however, are not necessarily 
free of power relations which can hinder and manipulate policymaking.  
These conclusions derive from research that I conducted on North Sea fisheries 
stakeholders and the North Sea RAC (NSRAC), the most well established of these 
bodies. The research comprised a detailed case examination of Common Fisheries Policy 
governance reforms. It included analysis of EU policy documents, press reports and 
websites and over 50 semi-structured interviews with the key players in North Sea 
fisheries governance including: ministers, politicians, policymakers, fisheries 
representatives, NGOs and other pressure groups. In addition, I attended ten NSRAC 
Executive Committees, General Assemblies, Working Groups and focus groups, between 
2004 and 2006. This fieldwork was mainly orientated towards the UK, but also involved 
several interviews from bodies representing other nations, regions, localities, etc. In the 
discussion that follows, I will first outline the remit and functions of RACs, and then 
sketch the different stakeholder discourses involved in, and on the margins, of NSRAC. I 
then explain how the presence of dominant discourses might work to effectively exclude 
some stakeholders from the RACs by delimiting what is ‘sayable’, and also how there are 
others factors which might militate against potential participation in them. I argue that the 
act of representing constituents also involves some exclusions and that some stakeholders 
potentially have a privileged access to decision-making. Finally, I make the case that 
pursuing consensus and compromise may involve acts of domination and a recourse to 
authority and leave little room for dissent.  
2 Sea change – the fisheries’ regional advisory councils  
The RACs are consultation bodies with a brief to directly advise the Commission, which 
is the EU’s policy forming body, on fisheries. The RACs were brought into being after 
the 2002 reform of the CFP, in an attempt to improve decision-making (CEC, 2002). 
NSRAC members meet as a General Assembly once per year, from which an Executive 
Committee is drawn, meeting at least three times per year, to consider the advice 
produced by its Working Groups. These last are ad hoc bodies, meeting to discuss 
specific issues, and comprising Executive members and observers (see Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1 Decision-making structure 
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Source: NSRAC (2004) 
It was decided in negotiations at the Council of Ministers that there should be 24 
members of the Executive Committee of NSRAC, and that these should comprise the 
most significant stakeholders concerned with fishing in this maritime region. The 
Executive Committee’s membership is drawn from organisations nominated by the 
General Assembly (which are in turn, at least initially, nominated by concerned Member 
States). Of them, two-thirds must come from the fishing industry and one third must 
represent ‘other’ interests, like green NGOs and consumer groups. This constitution 
reflects the Council’s decision that national catching organisations (representing 
fishermen, fleet owners, skippers etc.) should be represented on the Executive Committee 
in approximate proportion to their economic, rather than geographical, interests in the 
North Sea. From the very start then, it seems that economic interests were to be of 
fundamental importance to the RACs.  
The RACs are charged with a number of functions. They are expected to provide 
advice to the Commission, to channel information between local stakeholders and 
policymakers, to react to proposed policy and to create advice proactively rather than 
adopting the short-term crisis management approach that has characterised former failed 
governance regimes. Their members have been asked to work deliberatively, and 
consensually and as a result the advice they produce must reflect compromise.  
There are few examples in the EU of where industry and NGOs work together, and 
not through the fulcrum of the Commission. The RACs constitute one such example. 
They represent the only stakeholder forum where diverse interests deliberate together in a 
devolved way, i.e., at a lower scale of governance than that of the EU (Griffin, 2005). 
This replaces a situation where, before the RACs were formed, the fisheries sector had 
been characterised by deep and public divisions between fishermen and scientists on the 
one hand, and environmental groups on the other. Now however, in the environment of 
the RACs all issues are to be decided through ‘consensus’ between these participants 
(NSRAC, 2004),  which is a radical departure from the sorts of fisheries politics that 
characterised previous governance arrangements. Consensus is now heralded as a Holy 
 5 
Grail in EU decision-making. This is because, according to the EU, decisions arrived at 
in consensual environments are widely perceived as more legitimate than those arrived at 
hierarchically.
1 
Indeed, consensus was seen as such an important aspect of the new 
governance arrangements that it was enshrined in the legislation establishing the RACs 
(Council Decision, Article 7 (COM, 2004)).  
3 Participation and power in fisheries management  
3.1 Power and discourse  
Another important ethos behind the RACs is that they should provide fora for improving 
mutual understanding by giving participants an insight into the discourses used by others: 
i.e., the shared truths and rationalities that stakeholders express and embody. ‘Discourses’ 
refer to the multiple ways we make meaning, and structure our understanding of the 
world: they hold our taken-for-granted assumptions and thus contain within them their 
own ‘regimes of truth’. Such discourses can be distinguished in fisheries by looking at 
how stakeholders define ‘the problem’ and ‘the solution’ in this sphere of economic 
activity. Table 1 below outlines some of the key manifestations of the ‘stakeholder 
discourses’ that I have identified in the fisheries debate. The fact that different groups of 
stakeholders may have different discourses has profound implications for deliberative 
politics. If groups come to a discussion forum with quite different truth claims it will take 
much deliberative work to reach a shared understanding.  
Table 1 Aspects of North Sea fisheries stakeholder discourses  
Stakeholder 
discourse  
North Sea groups who 





Nature has intrinsic value. Fishermen are 
villains and pillage the ocean. Anti big 
business, but pro artisanal fisheries.  
Reformist 
Green  
WWF RSPB Seas At 
Risk Anglers’ Alliance  
Fish is a form of natural ‘capital’ and can be 
managed. Crisis derives from weak policies 
and/or implementation failure. Sustainability 
achieved via regulated market, working 
together and being rational.  
Nationalist  Save Britain’s Fish* Cod 
Crusaders* Scottish 
Nationalist Party* 
Conservative Party*  
Anti EU and nationalistic. Fish symbolise 
nationhood, history and supremacy. Saving 
Britain’s Fish is also ‘Saving Britain’ (see 
Figure 2). Fishermen are natural stewards of 
the ocean.  
Community  Cod Crusaders* North 
Sea Women’s Network  
Fish represent livelihoods and place. 
Emotional attachment to communities, which 
the CFP is decimating. ‘Families are 
suffering’.  
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Attachment to fishing as a way of life. The 
problem is caused by state institutions not 
sufficiently taking account of the industry 
and by pressure from ‘eco-fascists’ and 
‘irrational’ greens.  
 
Note: * Organisations with an asterisk are not members of the RACs.  
 
 
Figure 2 Save Britain’s Fish is not just saving Britain’s fish but saving Britain.  
Source: Accessed in January 2006 from www.sovereignty.org.uk  
And until a shared understanding is reached no consensually agreed solution – which is 
after all the remit of RACs – can be reached. But, as Table 1 shows, the fisheries 
stakeholders involved in or situated on the margins of NSRAC have somewhat diverse 
discourses. Hence, while stakeholders might be using the same words to debate solutions 
their meanings can be radically different. But, arguably, before true consensus can be 
reached there must first be agreement on the language used (Wittgenstein, 1969). 
For example, fish can represent anything from a way of life to a means to capital 
accumulation, or they may even be symbols of nationhood or supremacy. Hence, while 
there are ‘moments’ in RAC meetings where stakeholders appear to develop instances of 
genuine mutual understanding these only come about after many hours of deliberation 
from first principles, usually in a focus group setting. A focus group held on long-term 
sustainability objectives in 2005 did, according to participants from all sides of the 
debate, yield agreement on the nature of the sustainability problem, however, tensions 
still remained about the time scale required to solve the problem, with green groups 
pressing for immediate action and industry representatives favouring a longer-term 
solution.  
I found that in practice, stakeholder discourses are not always treated equally. Some 
are marginalised while others may be regarded as privileged. For example, the ‘industry’ 
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and ‘reformist green’ discourses are favoured and deemed rational while ‘radical green’ 
and ‘nationalist’ discourses are sometimes considered ‘extreme’ and irrational. One 
example of how a ‘privileged’ discourse dominates RAC meetings is seen in Jorgen 
Holmquist’s (Director General, DG Fisheries) demand that RAC participants must work 
within the rules and regulations of the CFP (Holmquist, 2004). So RAC members are 
required to sign up to its principles before they can become members of the Executive 
Committee or General Assembly. Consequently, views representing radical departures 
from the CFP cannot be admitted are branded ‘extremist’, and are therefore never brought 
into debates. Hence, the actors who want to pursue a particular course of action or to be 
heard, must, in order to gain legitimation, conform with a favoured discourse. As one 
fisheries representative put it:  
“... the people in my industry always say: ‘Bang the table and tell them 
[the Commission] you’re not doing it. Bang the table real hard, that’ll 
scare them and they’ll want to do it’. You know, you may bang the table 
once: you certainly won’t be able to do it a second time. So you’ve 
actually got to engage them at their level, use their language.” (Emphasis 
respondent’s own)2 
Of course, if stakeholders with radically different discourses are not seriously entertained 
in the deliberative political process, clearly this situation constitutes an exercise of power 
– where the dominant discourses ultimately restrict what will be listened to seriously and 
therefore limit what stakeholders can say in practice.  
3.2 Effective exclusion  
There is no doubt that stakeholder involvement in EU fisheries management is fuller and 
more complex than before the CFP reform. But, as seen above, full or effective 
participation by all stakeholders can in practice be undermined. For instance, radical 
groups with a political discourse and activism which are entirely different from those of 
the mainstream are not even involved in RACs. The fact of their effective exclusion can 
tell us as much about the governance process as can a consideration of those who are 
involved, since omitted groups or actors operating ‘outside’ the political process are 
inevitably constitutive of those ‘inside’. Those organisations which have a stake in North 
Sea issues but are not present in the political process are groups like the Cod Crusaders, 
who represent fishing communities, Save Britain’s Fish, who are anti-EU and anti-CFP, 
and Greenpeace and Sea Shepherds – who both speak primarily for ‘nature’ and are 
radical conservation activists (see Table 1). 
In general, there are several reasons why these stakeholders are missing. They may 
have been nominally invited to be NSRAC members, but the invitation to join was 
rejected because these particular stakeholders perceived that:  
 • RAC membership necessitated accepting principles which compromised their 
beliefs  
 • they lacked sufficient resources to participate effectively  
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 • they felt they may only discuss technical and not structural problems  
 • they did not want to join the ‘game’ of deliberative democracy since joining implied 
consenting to the possibility of their own defeat.  
Thus, Greenpeace considered signing up for RAC membership but declined:  
“You are meeting every few months, and putting a lot of energy into 
reading all the crap you have to read, [...] you know, if you look at it 
scientifically, you might only be able to change minor details in the 
proposals. [...] I don’t think it’s good to be in these RACs now, because 
you put a lot of effort in it, but in the end your voice is not heard. You 
have to give everyone an equal importance.”
3
 
Effective exclusion is seen again in the example of Save Britain’s Fish, who did enquire 
about RAC membership. But to become members, they would have had to sign up to the 
principles of the CFP, which they vehemently oppose (see Figure 2). Hence, mere 
participation in the regime would compromise their basic principles.  
This requirement to sign up to encoded laws actually serves not only to exclude but 
also to obscure the presence of power. Thus, a putative ‘equal opportunity’ to join RACs, 
from which groups appear to exclude themselves, here entrenches the position of 
hegemonic groups because, it is arguable, the rules of the game are unfair to start with.  
According to one interviewee, other effectively excluded groups include coastal 
fishermen – drawn from small fishing communities. It is argued that their voices are 
stifled on the RACs by larger, usually national, fishing organisations. A spokesperson 
from Seas At Risk, a federation of marine focused environmental NGOs, has maintained 
that this constitutes domination, by big-business over more local interests in the fisheries 
stakeholder landscape.
4 
Some individual fishers, too, have complained about 
overweening influence of larger and multiple vessel owners in the Executive Committees 
of the fishing industry organisations.  
3.3 Stakeholder representation, accountability and power  
In EU fisheries it is not the citizens or individual fishermen who participate in 
consultation fora such as RACs and the Advisory Committee of Fisheries and 
Aquaculture, but, rather, their representatives. This raises further questions about the 
constituencies of such representatives: who the constituents are, how they become 
members of their stakeholder groups and how it is that their demands are represented in 
the political process. And are the stakeholders ‘standing in for’, i.e., representing others, 
or ‘standing as’, i.e., representing themselves? Do they represent people or economic 
interests or values? The policy and stakeholder literature is not always clear. All these 
issues clearly have profound implications for accountability in a governance system 
striving to be more accountable and legitimate than previous government incarnations. 
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Representations, whether political or cultural, both reflect and constitute reality and so 
it is never a neutral process and thus always involves power. This fact then should prompt 
us to consider what, out of the constituents’ interests, is being represented – and, 
crucially, what is left unrepresented, and therefore effectively powerless. NGO literature 
frequently makes claims about representing ‘nature’, for instance, without articulating 
what this might and might not involve. And though NGOs have fully paid up supporters 
they often claim to represent the much wider constituency of unborn generations. Hence, 
the RSPB’s slogan, ‘For Birds, for people, for ever’ makes it clear that the organisation is 
not only representing civil society but also an unborn civil society, who, evidently, 
cannot tell the RSPB what they want or require.  
Such constituents do not actively apply for membership, they become affiliates by 
default. This may be a truism of course, but it does indicate how some stakeholder 
representatives have power over constituencies beyond any remits they are given in 
formal terms. Interestingly, the Sea Shepherds assert that they represent ‘animals’, 
arguing that though protecting creatures would ultimately benefit humanity it is the 
protection of animals for their own sake that is important to their organisation. And while 
the representation of animals may well be desirable, they cannot of course communicate a 
wish to be involved or spoken for in the political process, let alone articulate their 
demands (though presumably seals would lobby against a proposed seal cull). If such 
constituents are to be represented, more thought needs to be given to how we might speak 
for them in a way that does not entirely reflect out own prejudices (Latour et al., 2005). 
Save Britain’s Fish argues that it represents “all those who believe that control of fishing 
rights should be repatriated to the nation state”.
5 
Here again, membership of the 
organisation is not always actively applied for, citizens with a particular, nationalistic, 
point of view are enrolled by default. Once more, representing such a membership can be 
problematic. ‘Constituents’ of the Sea Shepherds and Save Britain’s Fish have no 
automatic entitlement to change policy, or any recourse if they feel the organisation does 
not sufficiently embody their views.  
3.4 Representation – in whose interest?  
Perhaps, in order to better understand the power of representatives in governance 
processes, we should ask, when endeavouring to be inclusive, not only who groups 
represent, but also what their interests are. These interests include the material: vested 
interests in policy outcomes may be pecuniary for instance. As if to underline this, the 
RACs have been created as limited liability companies (NSRAC, 2004). This is not just a 
technical procedure; it seems to instil a corporate sensibility upon the RAC character. For 
instance, during one meeting an NSRAC senior official, referred to the participants as 
‘shareholders’ and in a communication to the Commission he designated the executive 
committee as the ‘board of directors’. This might be considered to create a bias towards 
business interests and therefore to define the discourse – what is sayable and not sayable.  
In fisheries, since the turn to ‘good’ governance and active involvement of interested 
parties rather than just consultation, private interests are now more fully involved in 
public politics, and the lines of responsibility between them are more blurred. Private 
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interests are often charged with functions previously accorded to the state, an 
involvement thought necessary not only because industry has technical expertise that 
policymakers can draw on, but also because if private stakeholders ‘buy in’ to regulation, 
they will probably be more likely to implement it. This is especially important in the 
fisheries context since it is thought that one of the major obstacles to achieving 
sustainable fisheries is noncompliance with regulation by fishermen who feel alienated 
from a decision-making infrastructure which disenfranchises them. Much is made of the 
benefits of thus involving private interests in public government but less thought is given 
to the implications for power of such participation. For it might be that the financial 
interests of fishing organisations run counter to the interests of civil society at large – it 
might be in the latter’s interests to preserve ecosystems and in a financially powerful 
industry’s immediate interests to exploit them: “The problem”, says Kirby (2004), “with 
the EU’s Common Fisheries Policy is not that it’s common – it has to be that – but that 
the ministers represent the fishermen, not the fish”.  
Yet truly democratic deliberative processes are supposed to focus on this common 
good rather than individual self-interest, and importantly they should oblige vested 
interests to robustly justify their assertions in the context of publicly held values (Jentoft 
and Mikalsena, 2001). However, in reality there are deontological difficulties associated 
particularly with involving commercial private interests in deliberation. For, when their 
interests are ‘structural’ we might legitimately ask how actors representing them can 
possibly put them to one side. Yet having a ‘moral point of view’ is a prerequisite for 
deliberative practices according to Audard (2006), and the process must be conducted by 
‘individuals’ motivated principally by a ‘sense of justice and conception of the good’ (à 
la Rawls), and not vested interests. Though fishing industry actors may strive to 
‘overcome self-interest’, they have also to go back to their constituencies and report to 
their members, demonstrating how they represented their interests fully in deliberation. 
Their position clearly contrasts with that of green NGOs who, “don’t have anything to 
loose, they don’t have a real stake in the ground like we do”.
6 
 
Surprisingly, given that the Commission makes much of civil society’s participation in 
policy formation, there is no representation of civil society on NSRAC, excepting for a 
place reserved for a consumer group. This perhaps suggests that in the fisheries case, the 
EU conceives of ‘civil society’ as largely a collective of consumers. Clearly, however, 
NGOs like Greenpeace and the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds (RSPB) are not 
consumer groups, though they do claim to represent wider society. In fact NGOs are 
often proclaimed as the real voice of civil society, but it is very often unclear whose 
precise interests they do represent. For example, while WWF does espouse a desire to 
create a ‘harmonious’ relationship between people and nature, its Executive is certainly 
not open to the scrutiny or participation of civil society: policy directions are determined 
by a non-elected executive behind closed doors.
7 
In fishing industry circles environmental 
NGOs are widely conceived of as a powerful lobby and frequent complaints are made in 
the fishing press about the perceived ‘undue’ influence of the greens
8 
over fishing policy. 
It is argued that many groups like Greenpeace and WWF have a disproportionate 
influence over the Commission, who then gives ‘undue’ consideration to environmental 
matters (pers comm. fishing industry representative). Given that the RSPB, an NSRAC 
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Executive member, has over one million members in the UK it is not difficult to see why 
the industry feel unease about its influence in Brussels. Such concerns have been raised 
in other policy sectors too, with the Countryside Alliance, for instance, alleging that “if 
RSPB were officially a business rather than a charity then it would be one of the great 
corporate successes… with an income twice that of a small island nation and more 
members than any British political party” (Baynes, 2006, p.1). RSPB contrasts with 
fishing organisations, who have only a few thousand members, but the latter argue that as 
resource users they ought to have a greater claim to political influence.  
Green NGOs do of course have considerable power, either in the threat to mobilise 
public opinion through apparently representing it (Jentoft and Mikalsena, 2001), or to 
realise latent consumer power, which could undermine industry profitability. However, 
for Castree the popularity of environmental NGOs does not necessarily translate into 
power to influence policy decisions (Castree, 2006). And some argue that in truth they 
have played only a modest role in shaping the conservation agenda in fisheries (Todd and 
Ritchie, 2000).  
4 Stakeholder conflict and power  
Much of the work on present governance arrangements in Europe represents them as 
fairly harmonious, where power is relatively evenly distributed. However, in fisheries 
governance the stakeholders have been notoriously divided on this question. 
Environmentalists have often argued that the fishing industry held far too much sway 
with the ministers while industry groups have complained that greens had 
disproportionate power with the Commission. These stakeholder perceptions might 
suggest a situation ripe for conflict, and indeed some theorists of power insist that it is 
primarily conflictual (e.g., Dahl, 1969; Bachrach and Baratz, 1970; Lukes, 1974) because 
uneven power relations inevitably produce conflict.  
Other theorists, however, maintain that power is primarily consensual i.e., subjugated 
groups frequently acquiesce in their own subjugation (Arendt, 1970; Parsons, 1963). Yet 
others acknowledge the scope for conflict in consensual arrangements and vice versa 
(Foucault, 1980; Clegg, 1989). In other words, uneven power relations can still be at 
work in what appear to be harmonious and conciliatory situations, and this ‘harmonious 
conflict’ appears in evidence in fisheries governance.  
4.1 Harmonious conflict  
RACs should produce opinions on Commission fishery policy proposals. Under the 
previous, pre-RACs, system of consultation, different stakeholder groups were able to 
give their own opinions direct to the Commission. For instance, WWF might produce an 
opinion, and Europêche, which represents Europe’s fishing industry, might do the same, 
and any differences between them would have to be resolved at European level. 
However, now, under the RACs, stakeholder groups produce one collective opinion. This 
means that differences must be ironed out before the opinion document is made available 
to DG Fisheries. Although minority opinions can be recorded, in practice this has been 
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discouraged for fear of presenting a disunited and therefore, weakened front to the 
Commission. This, it is believed, could undermine any influence the RACs hope to have. 
According to the Commission, legislating for consensus has been a successful procedure 
so far, and the deeply ingrained differences between, say environmentalists and the 
industry, have been ‘overcome’ to produce views that ostensibly take into account all 
sides of the argument. It is certainly the case in many NSRAC meetings that open 
confrontation is largely absent or infrequent. 
But while good natured working relationships between participants makes harmony 
easier to achieve, it unusual for conflict to be avoided at all times, even if it is apparently 
‘harmonious conflict’, because all political interactions include antagonisms at one time 
or another (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985). And although, broadly speaking, the interest 
groups forming NSRAC are the same as those who participated in policymaking before 
the RACs, they interact in ways which are new and ostensibly more democratic, yet still 
may include some of the old antagonisms and power struggles. For example, according to 
a senior member of the Scottish White Fish Producers Association, some (unspecified) 
countries are already trying to abuse the operations of the RACs for their own national 
interests (Fishupdate, 2005). It seems that this fear has been realised in a number of early 
RAC meetings where some national representatives have subverted collaboration by 
stressing their own narrow agendas.  
Additionally, latent conflict in a ‘harmonious’ environment is suggested by the 
behaviour of some RAC delegates, when they seek collaborative solutions in the meeting 
room but behave discordantly outside of it. This situation might be one that produces a 
consensus in a vacuum, where actors agree to one set of principles inside the meeting 
room but then go back to their constituencies and say quite different, sometimes 
contradictory, things. For instance, the industry has accused green representatives of 
‘doubling crossing’ them, when the latter sought collaboration with the former within the 
milieu of NSRAC to solve sustainability problems, whilst simultaneously campaigning 
on a basis which (the industry thought) would undermine the economic viability of 
fishing vessels (Fishing News, 2006). Again, one NSRAC executive acquiesced with the 
Commission’s cod recovery measures in a meeting in 2005, saying that “what we are 
trying to do is allow our guys to live and allow cod to live as well” (Fishupdate, 2006). 
However, less than two months later, at the politically difficult time of the fish quota 
negotiations, the same figure, this time representing a fishing association in the UK, said 
“ the catching sector had to be released from the ‘strait jacket’ of cod recovery” 
(Fishupdate B, 2006). 
Furthermore, interviews conducted for this research suggest that there is a feeling 
amongst some groups that while NSRAC’s consultation documents may appear to be 
conciliatory, in reality divisions still remain. Some of these may be differences that 
cannot be mediated or overcome through deliberation alone. For example, some NGOs 
argue that in the climate of compromise environmental objectives are really being 
overshadowed by economic ones, because RACs are effectively ‘industry led’.
9 
The 
fishing industry has argued that when consultation was mainly focussed in Brussels that 
environmental goals took ‘undue precedence’. However, the industry is confident that 
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4.2 Agreeing to disagree – consensus, compromise and power  
Compromise is coupled with consensus in decision-making because a consensus is a 
position reached by a group as a whole. It thus might often require a settlement of 
differences in which different sides make concessions. Compromises are, of course, 
necessary features of liberal democracy (Bellamy, 1999). They notionally require that all 
sides can take something away from the process, presupposing a rough equality of power. 
However, the notion and practice of compromise obscures the fact that uneven power 
relations can be at work. For example forcing a compromise can, of itself, be an act of 
domination, and the discourse of compromise can be used by elites to exclude others or 
render particular positions unreasonable. Compromises might, in fact, favour those 
interests who shout loudest, or who are part of a dominant discourse. To put it another 
way, there might be no genuine compromise, because one set of values is more dominant, 
or more powerful and those who represent the dominant values can better mobilise this 
bias in order to gain influence. In the context of the EU, economic-liberalisation is the 
dominant discourse: radical policies that threaten it, involving greater environmental 
regulations, are very often sidelined (Griffin, 2004; for further examples and discussion 
see Pepper (1999) and Swyngedouw (2005)).  
But the notion of compromise includes the concept of ‘balance’. For reformist 
environmentalists ‘balance’ usually implies that change can only occur to ‘acceptable 
levels’. The ubiquity of such expressions in EU political discourse tends to conceal the 
fact that they are relative terms. They are meaningful only in terms of the position within 
the discursive spectrum from which the debate is couched. For instance, the ‘acceptable’ 
level of dolphin deaths from the bass fishery for fishermen of the ‘industry’ discourse is 
radically different from that which is ‘acceptable’ to ocean campaigners of the ‘radical 
green’ discourse. This is because the environmental groups’ discourse is premised on the 
intrinsic value of nature and the wellbeing of human kind more generally, while fishers 
argue from a more instrumental discourse (see Table 1 above). Often, then, the 
compromises that are made mask very different underlying principles emanating from 
divergent discourses.  
Yet an interview with a senior commission official suggests that it is possible to reach 
a pluralistic ‘balance’ between these very different positions:  
Interviewer: Are there differing ideas about sustainability?  
Kirkegard: There are, clearly. For example, certain interests would say 
“OK, my present need is to continue to fish without having dolphins 
getting in the way”. “[Others would say]... my need is not to fish, it is to 
have the pleasure of looking at dolphins” [chuckle]. And what we [the 
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Commission] have to do is effectively find some kind of balance or 
compromise between all interests.
11
 
A political decision of this nature, requiring a ‘balanced’ arbitration between 
incommensurable goals like ‘protecting dolphins for their intrinsic worth’ and ‘fleet 
viability for the next financial year’, is ultimately a power-laden exercise. It involves an 
appeal to superior authority or reason where those with power determine what is rational 
and reasonable (Flyvbjerg, 1998). For the fishing industry before the recent governance 
changes, what was considered reasonable was strictly determined by an ‘all-powerful’ 
Commission who effectively acted as the final arbiter between different world views. 
However, now in the milieu of fisheries governance reform such arbitration between 
values is also performed within the RACs. While this might be a desirable state of affairs 
in respect of producing a more applicable policy which has stakeholder ‘buy in’, this 
arbitration is not free of uneven power relations.  
A further problem is that seeking consensus through deliberation in ideal conditions 
should engender a rationality that will not only foster justice but will also produce the 
best solution to problems. However, this search for a ‘definitive rationality’ through 
consensus means that there is little room left for a sense of injustice, for resistance and 
for criticism of what is deemed as rationally acceptable. As Iris Young suggests, 
deliberative processes need not conclude with consensus at all, participants should have 
room to dissent (Young, 2000). But being forced to agree a common line, as the RACs 
routinely are, means that dissenting positions are ruled out at an early stage, and they do 
not usually come to the notice of the Commission as would have been the case before the 
governance reforms.  
However, conflict within the context of participatory situations might not necessarily 
thwart the process of reaching decisions that are satisfactory to all parties involved in the 
struggle. Dialogue does not have to produce consensus to be useful for governance 
purposes. Perhaps what is more important is that the minorities should feel that their 
views are as important as those of the majority group (Gemmill and Bamidele-Izu, 2002). 
For political theorist Mouffe (1999), rational consensus cannot be reached without some 
degree of exclusion. She argues that a democratic society should make room for dissent 
and conflicting views or discourse:  
“The prime task of democratic politics is not to eliminate passions nor to 
relegate them to the private sphere in order to render rational consensus 
possible, but to mobilise those passions towards the promotion of 
democratic designs. Far from jeopardizing democracy, agonistic 
confrontation is in fact its very condition of existence.” (Mouffe, 1999, 
p.756)  
5 Conclusion  
I have suggested that new governance arrangements designed to foster greater 
inclusiveness can empower some actors while disempowering others. Needless to say, 
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participatory practices will always involve exclusions, and be distorted by power, but this 
fact is not manifest in the good governance rhetoric which often obscures the limits to 
inclusion or the presence of domination. In fact, governance innovations like the RACs 
mean that new actors rise to prominence; some actors’ positions are consolidated; while 
others’ are excluded or their positions diminished (Swyngedouw, 2005). It is clear that in 
this new governance forum, NSRAC, designed to embody a more pluralist and 
deliberative style of policymaking, certain stakeholder groups do appear to have more 
influence than others, not only because they may have greater resources at their disposal 
but also because the decision-making system is weighted towards them (Blowers, 1984) 
by: 1) giving them disproportionate representation or 2) favouring their discourses. This 
‘excess’ power may have come, as demonstrated here, through dominating the discourse 
of rationality (Flyvbjerg, 1998), or through better ‘colonising’ decision-making 
institutions (Owens, 2000), or the reasons could be to do with structural domination 
where the government institutions work predominantly for the interests of capital 
(Benton, 1997).  
However, as I have shown here, power in governance arrangements is not usually 
naked: it may be implicated in seemingly innocuous and conciliatory terms like 
‘consensus’ and ‘compromise’ that can be deployed in such ways as to intensify 
inequities and further legitimise already-favoured actors or views. It may be that pluralist 
democracy needs to make more room for dissent and for the institutions through which it 
can be manifested. 
Governance theory then should not simply be concerned with how powers are divided 
between institutions, and apportioned to different authority levels. It should also enquire 
about the discourses, strategies and behaviour that affect the way in which powers are 
exercised – the realpolitik of governance. Excavating power is not just a theoretical 
diversion intended to remedy deficient governance theory, the presence of (uneven) 
power relations does have implications for accountability and effective policy-making. 
While the lines between private and public responsibility are indeed blurred as 
governance theorists tell us, it is clear that this may not be a desirable state of affairs and 
might work to marginalise or silence legitimate interests. While some of the 
consequences of governance reform may be desirable, contributing to better policy and 
law, there may be consequences that are unwelcome.  
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Notes  
 1 Mireille Thom (spokesperson for Commissioner Borg. European Commission – 
Fisheries Directorate-General), in an interview with the author, 2004.  
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 2 Mike Park (Chairman of the Scottish White Fish Producers Association Limited, 
Vice President of Scottish Fishermen’s Federation), in an interview with the author, 
2004.  
 3 Arjen Boon (Marine adviser/activist. Greenpeace), in an interview with the author, 
2005.  
 4 Carol Phua (Fisheries Policy/Sustainable Seafood. Seas At Risk/North Sea 
Foundation/De Noordzee milieuoganisatie), in an interview with the author, 2004.  
 5 Roddy McColl (Chairman Save Britain’s Fish/Fisherman’s Association Limited), in 
an interview with the author, 2005.  
 6 Michael Andersen (Danish Fishermen’s Association), in an interview with the 
author, 2004.  
 7 Industry leaders claim that this closed door policy contrasts with that of the UK 
fishermen’s industry federations, who have an ostensibly democratic internal 
structure with regular executive meetings where federation policy can be scrutinised 
and altered by potentially all members. However, it is worth noting that by no means 
all of the UK’s fishermen are members of the two main industry federations. 
Significant numbers of fishermen have opted out of membership or have joined other 
‘dissident’ organisations like Fishermen’s Association Ltd. (affiliated with Save 
Britain’s Fish) usually because they feel that the mainstream industry groups do not 
represent their views on the Common Fisheries Policy.  
 8 The term ‘Greens’ is used here (and in general EU fisheries discourse) to refer to 
environmental NGOs with a specific environmental remit.  
 9 Charlotte Mogenson (Fisheries Policy Officer. WWF), in an interview with the 
author, 2005.  
 10 Francisca Martinez Toledo (Assistant-Project Manager. Europêche/Cogeca), in an 
interview with the author, 2004.  
 11 Eskild Kirkegard (Chairman of ACFM – Advisory Committee on Fishery 
Management/ Commission EU Scientist), in an interview with the author, 2004.  
 
 
